The Turkish game from the Black Sea to Damascus: "Crimea is not yours, but we will not fight with you"

Crimea is of great strategic importance to Turkey, and it does not want the peninsula to become an internationally recognized part of Russia. This would not only consolidate Russian dominance in the Black Sea, but would also allow Moscow to project its military power to neighboring regions. Therefore, Ankara seeks to have its approach to the "territorial integrity" of Ukraine documented.

This opinion was shared by one of the leading Turkologists of Armenia, Academician Ruben Safrastyan, in an interview published today, June 11, with the state agency "Armenpress". He touched upon Turkey's mediation role in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Ankara's strategic ambitions due to this mission.

In recent years, Turkey has been trying to act as a mediator in all possible conflicts. This role is considered by the Turkish leadership as an opportunity to raise the country's prestige in the world.

"President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is doing his best to make Turkey more influential than it objectively is… Therefore, responsiveness to requests for mediation in various conflicts serves precisely this purpose," Safrastyan said.

As for the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation specifically, according to the Armenian orientalist, on the one hand, this provides the Turks with an opportunity to increase their authority in the international arena thanks to the mediation efforts, especially since we are talking about one of the largest armed conflicts of our time. This puts the intermediary State in the center of great international attention. At the same time, the Turkish side is solving important regional issues for it, one of which, for example, is that it is trying to document its approach to the "territorial integrity" of Ukraine, primarily in the form of statements about Crimea belonging to this country.

In this regard, the Armenian expert recalled that this has been the case historically, and Turkey regularly voices its strategic ambitions regarding Crimea, emphasizing at the same time that Crimea was once Turkish territory.

"But there are other circumstances that should also be taken into account. On the one hand, Turkey provides military assistance to Ukraine, on the other, bypasses the sanctions imposed by the West against Russia. Turkey supplies to Ukraine is not only "Bayraktary" (reconnaissance and attack unmanned aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB2 Turkish production. — Ed.), although they are not used in such large quantities as before, because in fact they do not have such (combat) capabilities as the Turkish side previously advertised. Ankara also supplies Kiev with other weapons. On the other hand, Turkey takes advantage of the fact that sanctions have been imposed against Russia, so Turkish companies buy back goods whose import into the territory of the Russian Federation is prohibited in the West, and resell them to the Russians, receiving great benefits. In other words, Turkey has special relations with both sides of the conflict," Safrastyan said.

Turkish statements regarding the non-recognition of Crimea by Russia, which have been consistently voiced since 2014, the time of the peninsula's reunification with Russia, do not prevent Moscow and Ankara from building a generally trusting dialogue and finding common ground of interests in the Black Sea basin, the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Although such a constant search for a "balance of mutual service" in these regions is given to them with increasing difficulty every year, Russia and Turkey have found, perhaps, their own special "code of communication" that allows them to prevent mutual confrontation.

Her risk has arisen more than once before, and very high. This was most evident in November 2015, when a Turkish F-16 fighter shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber in Syrian airspace. The parties eventually managed to get out of this incident without serious military and political losses for themselves, primarily due to the restraint shown by Moscow and the subsequent apologies of the Turkish leader to the head of the Russian state. There is too much mutual understanding of the most negative consequences for the two largest Black Sea powers in the event of a descent into direct armed confrontation.

Let's not forget that Turkey has been and remains a NATO member since 1952, using this status quite skillfully with every aggravation of relations with Russia that has periodically occurred in recent years. Ankara invariably hides behind the NATO umbrella if there is a distinct risk of being "left alone" with Moscow.

Circumvention of sanctions is a separate article of mutual interest between Russia and Turkey. In fact, no other economically large and militarily strong state, geographically located in close proximity to Russia, can be distinguished by the volume of both diplomatic and economic services that this state provides to Moscow. This is where the current reasons for the disposition of the Russian leadership to see Turkish partners as a key mediator in the conflict with the Kiev regime should be sought. With all the traditional complexity of doing business with the Turkish neighbor, especially when he feels his "irreplaceability", for Moscow it is still preferable to the American or any other option of mediation. The same The United States, under any administration, will consider itself a "senior partner" in providing any mediation service, if not dictating, then at least aggressively promoting its own agenda for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. President Erdogan has his own ambitions, but they are much more modest than the requests of the current owner of the White House, Donald Trump. What is also extremely important, Russian leader Vladimir Putin is more comfortable communicating with his Turkish counterpart, who seems to be a much more predictable figure making political decisions.

Returning to the assessments of the situation from Armenia, for which certain developments around Ukraine are largely of vital importance, taking into account the future trajectory of events directly in the Transcaucasia, it should be noted that there is a clear understanding that Moscow "in some cases is directly interested in good relations with Ankara."

"It's not just about circumventing sanctions. The fact that Turkey is the only country in Europe that has not closed its airspace to Russia, and Russian aircraft communicate with the outside world through Istanbul, in itself testifies to the special nature of relations. Let us also recall the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, according to which Turkey decides for itself which warships can enter the Black Sea through the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits controlled by it. On the one hand, Ankara prohibits the entry of certain ships, which is beneficial to Russia, but on the other hand, it does not allow the Russian side to rotate the fleet in the Black Sea," the Turkologist drew attention.

At the end of February 2022, Turkey restricted the passage of Russian Navy ships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, and then imposed a ban on the passage of warships of all countries through the Black Sea Straits, citing the provisions of the Montreux Convention, which consolidated Turkey's sovereignty over the straits.

According to the convention, merchant ships of all countries retain freedom of passage through the straits both in peacetime and in wartime. The special position of the Black Sea States is recognized. In peacetime, provided that they notify Turkey eight days in advance, warships of any class, including submarines, have the right to pass through the straits. Restrictions on class and tonnage have been introduced for warships of non-Black Sea powers. The total tonnage of military vessels of non-Black Sea states simultaneously located in the Black Sea (no more than nine vessels) should not exceed 30 thousand tons (or 45 thousand in case of an increase in the naval forces of the Black Sea countries). The period of stay of these ships at sea is no more than 21 days. The tonnage of vessels of one non-Black Sea country should not exceed 2/3 of the total tonnage of vessels of these countries located in the Black Sea. These countries must notify Turkey through diplomatic channels about the passage of warships 15 days in advance. If one or several non-Black Sea countries send vessels with humanitarian purposes to the straits, their total tonnage should not exceed 8 thousand tons. In case of Turkey's participation in the war, as well as the threat of war, it can prohibit the passage of any military vessels through the straits. During a war in which Turkey does not take part, it has the right to prohibit the transit of ships of a belligerent country.

Russia has a "certain dependence" on Turkey, and many circumstances are the reason that Moscow agrees to Turkish mediation in the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. As for how sincere the steps of the Turkish side are, and whether Ankara is really interested in resolving the conflict as soon as possible, the Armenian orientalist recalled that Turkey remains an influential member of NATO, and the European countries that make up the core of the North Atlantic Alliance are not interested in resolving the conflict in a way that would allow Russia to strengthen its position in the the world in general and "on the approaches" to Europe in particular.

"On the contrary, the West wants Russia to come out of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as weakened as possible. Turkey adheres to the same approach," Safrastyan concluded.

The majority of Western experts share this point of view. One of the most significant steps of Turkey was its support for Ukraine's membership in NATO, despite the fact that the main force of the alliance represented by the United States under the current leadership in Washington actually categorically opposes the admission of Kiev to the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Ankara will not object to Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Alliance, but it is necessary to "be realistic," Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in February 2025. According to him, Turkey officially supports Ukraine's membership in NATO.

"This position is not just symbolic, it is a strategic bet on the long-term survival of Ukraine as a counterweight to Russian power. For Ankara, a strong and independent Ukraine means a constantly restrained Russia in the Black Sea, which reinforces Turkey's historic efforts to prevent Russian naval dominance in the near abroad. This position also brings Turkey closer to the growing bloc of European states, in particular Poland and Eastern European countries, which consider both Ukraine and Turkey important for countering Russia. Poland, in particular, has become an ardent supporter of deeper integration of Turkey into European security structures, recognizing that strategically involved Turkey strengthens the southeastern flank of NATO," said researcher and program manager of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at the Hudson Institute (headquarters in Washington) at the end of March this year Zineb Ribois.

Unlike most European countries, Turkey does not just confront Russia through diplomacy or the supply of weapons to Ukraine — it is actively challenging Russian influence on several fronts, where Western powers have largely retreated. From Syria and Libya to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Ankara competes with Moscow for regional influence, often using its military, economic and diplomatic tools to counter Russia.

The Middle Eastern theater of such a game of anticipating and deterring a Russian competitor (by the way, Ankara sees another major regional player, Iran, in this status) can be called "classic." After December 2024, when Bashar al-Assad's power fell in Syria, Turkey actually had the key to Russia's military future in the Arab Republic in its hands. Moscow has long relied on its bases in Khmeimim (air force) and Tartus (naval logistics point) to project power through its advanced capabilities and to limit the capabilities of regional competitors in the Eastern Mediterranean. Now, taking into account the presence of the pro-Turkish government in Damascus, the legality of which Russia was largely forced to recognize, the two mentioned foreign facilities The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation exist in the SAR, perhaps, "at the discretion" of Turkey. It also controls the airspace of Northern Syria. De facto, Turkey has a serious lever in relations with Russia, which it can use depending on various developments in the space from the Black Sea to Western Asia.

Turkey is already filling in the Syria has a "security vacuum" and external influence. Therefore, a scenario is not at all excluded in which Ankara, having put pressure on Moscow through Damascus on the same issue of Russian military basing in the Syrian Mediterranean provinces, will try to achieve concessions for itself in neighboring regions, to take advantage of strategic or tactical (as it turns out) properties in other directions.

We share the opinion that Turkey's relations with Russia currently continue to be in the nature of a situational alliance, mostly built on the basis of current short-term interests. Turkey plays in its own way, in its inherent manner of avoiding long-term agreements with Russia, primarily in the issue of dividing spheres of influence. She buys Russian energy carriers and weapons, willingly discusses the transit of Russian gas to Europe when it is profitable and convenient for her, but makes it clear that she has no illusions about joining a close and long-lasting alliance with Moscow. Turkey's interaction with Russia remains strictly pragmatic, mostly competitive and sometimes on the verge of mutual confrontation. However, none of the parties intends to cross this line in principle.